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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
SHER KHAN,

Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO. 7346

PERRY ZOLEZZI, INC.,

/

Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
This action was commenced by the filing of a
complaint on April 18, 1947, setting up a cause of
action against the defendant, W. R. Perry, upon a
note executed by him to the plaintiff, and also
against the corporate defendant for the payment of
this indebtedness orthe defendant, W. R. Perry, upon
the ground that the corporate defendant had assumed
and agreed to pay this debt, and upon the further
ground that the corporate defendant received property in the amount of this note from the defendant
Perry, upon an undertaking to apply the property
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pursuant to such· promise· and pay the property or
money over to· the plaintiff. ·Plaintiff also alleged
that pursuant to such promise, the corporate defendant, on Sept. 21, 1946,- did pay $3,588.83 on this
debt of $18,588.83, leaving a balance due of $15000.00. A writ of attachment was issued and real
estate and personal property' of the def~ndant corporation was attached.
The defendant corporation enter~d a general denial and alleged that the sum of $3,588.83 was paid
by the defendant, W. R. Perry without authority of
the defendant corporation (R. 27). A plea alleging
that the cause of action was barre9. by the provisions
of 33-5-4, U.C.A. 1943 was also filed (R. 28).
On Nov. 19, 1947, plaintiff filed an amendment
to the complaint, adding a. second cause of action.
This second caJ.Ise ·of action· alleges a .sale by the defendant, Perry, of all of his assets, otherwise than in
the course of trade, and a failure of the purchaser to
comply with the Bulk Sf!1les Act-Sec.· 33..:2-2-U.S.C.
1943. (R 4~). The delict of the purchaser was .in
failing to distribute the purchase price of the assets
ratably to the creditors, in that all of the ·creditors
of the individual defendant were paid in full, whereas this creditor, the plaintiff, was paid only $3,588~83,
upon a total obligation of $18,588.83~ This creditor
was: paid approximately 19~.--o-f the amount of its
claim, whereas all other creditors were paid 100%.
Plaintiff alleged that assets of an agreed and reasonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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able value of $192,809.90 were transferred by the defendant, J?erry, to the corporate d~fendant, and at
that time the liabilities of the defendant, Perry, including $18,588.83, ·. owing to the plaintiff, were
$142,809.90. The· sale price then was more than
enough to pay all creditors 100% of the amount of
their claims.
The corporate defendant moved:
"to dismiss the second cause of action, or in
the alternative, to require plaintiff to elect between said alleged causes of action as to which
of the same he will stand upon as a basis for
his remedy, upon the ground and for the reason that said alleged causes of action and the
remedies sought are inconsistent in this, towit: That the alleged first cause of action,
by its tenns, seeks to enforce and secure the
benefits for plaintiff of a purported contract,
whereas under the alleged second cause of
action said plaintiff seeks to repudiate, disallow and declare null and void as to plaintiff
the said transaction referred to in the. first
cause of action." (R. 57)
·The fact that the corporate defendant stated in
its motion that the plaintiff was seeking to have the
sale declared null and void 'as to the plaintiff,' should
itself have brought to the attention of the corporate
defendant the fact that there was no inconsistency
between the first and second causes of action, in that
both causes of action· acknowledge that the contract
is valid as between buyer and seller, the second
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cause of action only adding the entirely consistent
allegation that as between the buyer and the seller's
creditors, the contract, by force of statute, was null
and void, a·nd by force of statute could be disre-·
garded. · We shall discuss this feature later. ·
The action of the court in denying this motion
to dismiss and in refusing to require the plaintiff to
make the election of remedies is the basis of the corporate defendant's First Assignment of Error (App.
Br. p. 26).
The corporate defendant then filed its answer
to the second ca~se of action (R. 60). It pleaded as
the second affirmative defense ( R. 65) :
"That the plaintiff has by filing its first
cause of action herein and by attaching the
funds of this d~fendant corporation, elected to
treat said _conveyance and transfer of property
from defendant, W. R. Perry, to this defendant
corporation as a valid conveyance and sale,
and has elected his remedy herein."
We mention the second affirmative defense before the first affirmative defense because the court
having sustained a demurrer to the second affirmative defense, the corporate defendant assigns that
action of the court as error in its second specification
of error (R. 26). The defendant here asserts that
even though the court did not order an election of
remedies, that the plaintiff by levying a writ of attachment elected to treat the conveyance and trans•
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fer ·of ·property from the defendant, Perry, to the defendant corporation as a valid conveyance, and that
plaintiff could not thereafter n1aii1tain the second
cause of action. We shall discuss these two assignments of error together, since they are essentially the
~arne, both dealing with that phase of the law known
as "Election of Remedies."
The answer to the second cause of action also
sets up a first affirmative defense, to-wit (R. 63):
"That this defendant therefore verily
and in good faith, believed that there were no
obligations of said defendant, W. R. Perry, outstanding and unpaid when it received from
said defendant, W. R. Perry, a conveyance of
said assets, and that there was no requirement
on its part to comply with the provisions of
Section 33-2-2 U.C.A. 1943."
It also pleaded (R. 64):
"That it _believed that said defendant, W.
R. Perry, had fully paid and discharged, by
payment, compromise or otherwise, all of the
debts and obligations of the defendant, W. R.
Perry; that by reason of said belief this defen-dant corporation transacted business and incurred obligations in its own name from the
date of its incorporation to the date of the
commencement of this action, in the belief
that it,- this defendant, was obligated for obligations created only by itself. That by reason
thereof, .plaintiff is guilty of laches in attempting at this time to question the validity of said
sale and assignment by defendant, W. R. PerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ry, to this defendant, and plaintiff is estopped
to question the validity thereof at this time."
Defendant also pleaded as part of this affinnative defense (R. 64) as follows:
"Defendant is informed, verily believes
and therefore alleges the fact to be, that the
said plaintiff agreed with the said defendant,
W. R. Perry,. that plaintiff would look to said
defendant, W. R. Perry, for payment .of said
obligation from his personal funds and would
regard said obligation as a personal indebtedness of said defendant, W. R. Perry."

It is notable that it is not pleaded that this agreement was with the corporate defendant, or that
there was an agreement releasing the corporate defendant from this obligation, or that any agreement
was made with the corporate defendant that the
plaintiff would· waive the provisions of the Bulk
Sales Act, enacted for the protection of creditors.
The foregoing sets out the facts required as a
preliminary to the argument to the corporate defendant's Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6.
None of these Assignments would have arrisen but
for the addition of the Second Cause of Action; therefore, instead of arguing these Assignments now, we
would prefer to discuss them when we get to the
Second Cause of Action.
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REPLY TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON FOURTH ASSIGNMENT
OF ERROR (P. 43 Appellant's Brief)

The Fourth Assignment of Error deals wholly
with the First Cause of action. Defendant complains
of the finding made that the defendant corporation
assumed and agreed to pay this debt of the individual
defendant and that it received property' from the
individual defendant upon an undertaking to apply
i1;· pursuant to such promise, to the payment of the
debt owing by the individual defendant. Defendant
also complains of the- finding of the subsidiary facts
tending to prove these ultimate facts, these subsidiary facts being that the corporation made entries on
the books showing that it had assumed this· debt,
and, secondly, that the corporation made a part payment of $3,588.83. We shall frrst disc~ss the fmding
that the corporation assumed and agreed to pay this
debt of the individual defendant, pointing out that
this was done by the terms of Exhibit B, which was
the pre-incorporation agreement executed by the
two incorporators who owned 100% of the stock of
the corporation. The writing, Exhibit B, meets the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. We shall also .
undertake to show that Exhibits C, D, E and H meet
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. If this
court concludes that these writings meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, then ·it would seem
to be unnecessary to proceed further in this brief to
establish the fact that the promise made by the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant corporation to pay the debt of Sher "1\halrwas
made by the defendant corporation which "has re~
ceived property of another upon an undertaking to
apply it pursuant to· such promise."
The bulk of this brief will be taken up by an exposition of the facts to demonstrate that the defendant corporation received property from the individual defendant upon an undertaking· to apply that
property to the payment of the debt of the individual
defendant. Less discussion will be required to establish the subsidiary fact that -a part paYment of $3,588.83 was made by the defendant corpor~tion
through its duly authorized officers and agents.
EXHIBIT· B WAS THE PRE-INCORPORATION AGREEMENT WHICH
BECAME BINDING UPON THE CORPORATION AND BY THE
TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT THE CORPORATION ·ASSUMED
AND AGREED TO PAY THE DEBT OF PLAINTIFF

Exhibit B states that W. R. Perry and one Stephen Zolezzi were to form a corporation, the stock in
which, after the conclusion of the transactions mentioned, were to be owned, in equal shares, by W. R.
Perry and Stephen Zolezzi. The plan was that W. R.
Perry was to acquire assets of the partnership·of Neil..
sen and Perry (W. R. Perry was· one partner) and
that Perry would pay off the debts of the partner·
ship and then contribute the, assets acquired from
the partnership, together with.fuis own assets, to the
corporation.. we here set forth those preliminary
provisions in Exhibit B which are necessary to an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Understanding of that paragraph, subdivision (b) of
Paragraph VIII, in which is found the promise to pay
the debt of the defendant, Perry, to this plaintiff.
These paragraphs are as follows:

'.'V.
The present liabilities which are owing
by Neilson & Perry, a partnership, are repre-·
sented by Mr. W. R. Perry to closely approximate the following:
Due Pacific National Life Assurance Company
$36,500.00.
secured by first mortgage on plant and
equipment
Principal $35,000.00
Accrued Interest $1,500.00
Federal withholding and payroll taxes
and property taxes
6,000 . 00
Sundry creditors for merchandise, construction, services, etc.
60,500.00
Unpaid drafts and contingent commitments
61,000.00

TOTAL

$164,000.00"

"VI.
It is agreed that funds to meet the foregoing liabilities, set forth in item ( 5) hereof,
will be provided as follows:
Proceeds of loan from First National Bank
of Salt Lake City, to be secured by first
mortgage on land, buildings and equipment
$80,000.00
Cash to be provided by subscription of Mr.
Zolezzi to stock of new corporation
50,000.00
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Cash to be contributed by Mr. PerrY di·· · · ................................. .
rectly to the First National Bank of Sal~
Lake City ,.
10,00Q.OO
Turkey drafts presently owned by Mr. W.
R. Perry which will be converted into
cash currently and contributed to First
National Bank by Mr. Perry
18,000.00
Accounts Receivable and turkey inventory
presently carried as partnership assets
which are expected to be converted into
cash to be delivered by Mr. Perry to
First National Bank of Salt Lake City
10~000.00

TOTAL

$168,000.00"

"VIII
Mr. Perry agrees that he will contribute
to the new corporation, in exchange for cancellation of $40,000.00 of the $50,000.00 note
given by him to the corporation and the issuance of 49,000 shares of the new corporation's $1.00 per share par value stock, the following properties:
(a) His equity in the real property and
improvements, which equity will
consist of said properties valued at
$135,000.00, subject to a first mortgage or deed of trust to secure the·
payment of $80,000.00, liability for
the payment of which obligation
will be assumed by the new corp~
oration. Value of real property
equity
$55,000.00
(b) Any cash remaining in the hands of
the First National Bank of Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1-1
City, which remains out of the sum
of $168,000.00 deposited under
item (6) above, after the payment
of other settlement of all of the liabilities of the partnership amounting to $164,000.00, per item (5).
Minimum net cash expected to be
contributed
4,000.00

--

It is understood that the liability
due Sher Khan, in the amount of
$23,588.83, may be settled temporarily by the payment of, say $5,000.00 in cash and the execution by
Mr. Perry of a not~ for the balance
of $18,588.83. In such event, the
cash remaining in the hands of the
First National Bank of Salt Lake
City, to be transferred by Mr. Perry
to the new corporation will be increased by $18,588.83 and will be
subject to the obligation incurred
·by Mr. Perry in the same amount of
$18,588.83.
(c)

Supplies and other prepayments
presently recorded on ·the partnership books, having a book value in
the approximate amount of $15,000.00, together with certain Accounts Receivable, supplies and
other assets presently owned by Mr.
Perry in his own right closely approximating in value the amount of
$15,000.00. Value of assets to be
contributed
$30,000.00·
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(d)

TOTAL OF ITEMS (a), (b) and
(c) to be contributed by Mr. Perry
$89,000.00

In consideration of the transfer to the
new corporation of the properties represented
by (a), (b) and (c) herein in this item (8)
set forth, the new corporation will cancel $40,~
000.00 of Mr. Perry's $50,000.00 n~te and issue
Mr. Perry 49,000 shares of its $1.00 per share
par value stock, as above indicated."
The assumption of this debt is found in the second paragraph of subdivision (b). It is true that the
defendant corporation assumed payment of the debt
- only if it received property in the amount of $18,588.83. As stated· in the introduction of this discussion, it will be necessary to establish the fact that the
defendant corporation received this sum of $18,588.83 and after that fact is established we shall set
forth our position as to the applicable law that makes
this pre-incorporation agreement the ~greement and
writing of the corporation.
THE CORPORATION RECEIVED FROM THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT,
PERRY, MORE THAN WAS REQUIRED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH
OF SUBDIVISION B. IT ACTUALLY RECEIVED $18,599.83 MORE
AS WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH OF SUBDIVISION (b) of PARAGRAPH VIII

. In paragraph V the liabilities of the partnership were estimated as being $164,000.00 and paragraph VI stated that $168,000.00 was to be provided
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from the sources stated in Paragraph VI to pay these
debts of $164,000.00. This $4,000.00 overage was to
be used by Perry, together with $85,000.00 more of
Perry's assets to repay the $40,000.00 loan to the corporation and to pay for 49,000 shares of the capital
stock of the ·corporation. This agreement was drawn
up~n the assumption that that amount of $4,000.00
would be. available if the figures used in paragraphs
V and VI were correct. However, the agreement itself recognized that these figures would be subject
to change. In the second paragraph of subdivision
(b) of Paragraph VIII, which we have quoted above,
it was understood that the liability due Sher Khan,
in the amount of $23,588.83 might be settled temporarily, by the payment of, say $5,000.00 in cash and
the execution by Mr. Perry of a note for the balance
of $18,588.83. As a matter of fact on the date of the
execution of this agreement, namely, July 17, 1946,
$5,000.00 had already been paid to Sher Khan and
the balance of the account was $18,588.83 and a note
had been given for that balance, and it was known
that this note was not due until Dec. 1, 1946 and that
this note would not be paid until the date it fell due.
Though the estimated amount of the debts of $164,000.00 as stated in paragraph V included the account
of Sher Khan in the amount of $23,588.83. (Exhibit
F, -First page of Accounts Payble), and funds were
going to be provided for the payment of the entire
account due to Sher Kahn, upon the date of the execution of this agreement, it was know that since this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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debt to Sher Khan was not going to be paid immediately, there would be more than $4,000.00 available
t<> the new corporation. The second paragraph of
VIII (b) took note of this eventuality, stating:
"In such event, the cash remaining in the
hands of the First National Bank of Salt Lake
City to be transferred by Mr. Perry to the new
corporation will be increased by $18,588.83,
and will be subject to the obligation incurred
by Mr. Perry in the same amount of 18,588.83.''
It was then apparent that if assets of $168,000.00
were provided to pay the debts of $164,000.00, less
the $18,588.83 due to Sher Khan, there would be left
an excess of $22,588.83, rather than an excess of only
$4,000.00. The corporate defendant then agreed
to this statement in paragraph VIII (b), that in consideration of receiving that extra amount of $18,588.83, in cash or its equivalent, the cash remaining
in its hands would be subject to the obligation incurred by Mr. Perry in the same amount of $18,588.83.
The corporate defendant admits this in its brief,
but the defendant argues <P. 48 of App. Brief) that
the Promotion Agreement-Exhibit B, .
"did not provide that the defendant corporation should assume the liability. Contends
that the agreement provided only that if Perry gave the corporation money equal to the
Sher Khan debt that the corporation should
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take the funds 'subject to' the obligation of
Sher Khan. The most that can be said of such
a provision would be that Perry might use
corporate funds to pay the debt. This is vastly
different from saying that the note becomes a
company liability."
Counsel for respondent must say that he is unable to see what is different about using the corporate
defendant's funds to pay the debt from setting up this
obligation as a company liability. Indeed, the corporation itself, upon its own books, with the acquiesence
and consent of the company's bookkeeper, stockholders, auditors and officers set this amount up on the
company's books as a liability. See Exhibit D, being
a true copy of the joumal entry on the books of Perry Zolezzi, Inc., taken from the General J oumal,
page 3, lines 1 to 9. This entry records the personal
property and assets taken over from W. R. Perry in
August of 1946 at a value of $40,152.94, and shows
the following contra-entries:
That it records a liability to Sher Khan of $18,588.83 and gives Perry credit on his loan account of
the difference of $21,564.11. It follows these entries
with the following explanation:
"To record receipt of assets ·and assumption of liabilities of W. R. Perry."
This is the company's own explanation of what
is meant by taking over these assets and stating that
it would take these assets over, subject to the obligaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiori of the Sher Khan account. The company's own
explanation is that it meant to, and did, assume the
~bligation to pay Sher Khan. Exhibit C also states
that the account of Sher Khan was assumed. by Perry
Zollezzi, Inc., the corporate defendant. Exhibit H
states:
"We will not be able to pay Mr. Sher
Khan on December 1st but we yvill be in a
position to do so by January 1Oth."
This Exhibit is signed by the company, albeit by W.
R. Perry, as President of the company.
Reference to these facts should dispel the statements of counsel for appellant that no additional
funds or property was received. Counsel for appellant blandly state~ (App. Br. 49):
"Mr. Duke, Perry's former employer and
later Secretary of the company, testified that
no such additional money was received by the
company. It was a paper transaction."
If counsel means by the words 'paper transaction' that the money or property was recorded on
paper in the books of the company, he is correct. If
he is using the term as being synonymous with a
transaction with_out substance, he errs grossly. Mr.
Duke testified to the contrary (R. 77):

"Q. · (by Mr. Arnovitz) Mr. Duke, I show you
Exibit G, which is the Account Receivable
Account of W. R. Perry. I will ask you to
refer to this record and tell us what balSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ance there was in favor of Mr. Perry as
an amount owing to Mr. Perry as of
August 6-no, well, as of this particular
period here?
A.

As of the last day of August there was a
credit balance due Mr. Perry of $4,310.40 .

. Q.

That was after setting up a credit for the
account of Sher Khan, wasn't it?

A.
Q.

That same day, yes.
In other words, after showing payment of
Sher Khan's account, Mr. Perry had contributed more assets by $4,310.40. than
the whole total of his debts were. Isn't
that right, what that account shows?
The account shows a credit balance.

A.

As of what date?
A. As of the last day of August."

Q.

Appellant makes reckless statements that the
action setting up this liability on Perry Zollezzi's
books was some sort of fraud by the defendant, Perry. (App. Br. 50 to 54, inc.)
<R. 159) Mr. Duke was asked by attorneys for
the appellant:

"Q.

A.

Was any direction on the part of directors
of the corporation in regard to its books
taken into consideration at the time you
set them up.
No-in that we did transfer the exact
balances of W. R. Perry, rather thanwe did have a copy of the minutes of the
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first Board of Directors' meeting, which
coincided-which figures coincided very
closely with the figures on the books, but
we transferred the actual book values.~'
Exhibit I contains ~he minutes of the special
meeting of the Board of Dir~ctors, and Mr. Duke acknowledges that the figures stated in the minutes
''coincided very closely with the figures on the
books." (R. 161)
Mr. Duke was asked:

"Q.

In regard to your opening entries in the
journal whose language is used in those,
in that journal, and who selected the
language used in that journal?
A. Mr. Evington of-Q. Mr. Evington?"
THE COURT. Though you may be clear,
- just what was Mr. Evington's positj-on in
this set-up?
MR. RICH. He has testified, your Honor,
he was a member of the firm of Wells,
Baxter & Miller.
·
·
THE COURT. A representative of that
firm and that is the only capacity he appeared in here in connection with this
original transaction of setting up the
books as a hired accountant?
MR. ELTON. That is _right._
THE COURT. Hired by the new corpora.
ti.on.?
MR. ARNOVITZ. _That is right.
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mE COURT. Is that correct?
MR. RICH. That is correct.
MR. ELTON. That's right."

As further evidence of the fact that the matter
of setting up books was not done at th.~ direction of
Mr. Perry, is found in the fact that when the accounts
receivable belonging to Mr. Perry were taken over
by the corporate· defendant they did fnot give Mr.
Perry credit for all of his accounts receivable, but
set up a reserve of $821.97 <R. 162 and 168). Surely
if Mr. Perry had given the orders, the accounts receivable would have been taken over at their full
face amount, rather than by setting up a reserve of
.J
$821.97.
More than all this, the auditors sent to Salt
Lake City by Mr. Zolezzi approved the values and
had checked over the entries made on the books of
the corporation (R. 155, 157). Mr. Pinska was an
accountant and auditor who came to Salt Lake City
with Mr. Zolezzi to examine the books of the corporation after they had been set up. After discussing
that examination of the books by Mr. Pinska, the following evidence was given by Mr. Duke: (R. 157)
"Q.

A.

But at any rate, after that examination,
no change was made in the values of
these assets as set up on the books of the
company?
No.
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Q.

And there never has been a change made,
has there, in the books of the company?

A.

No."

This discussion of the First Cause of Action demonstrated that the corporate defendant received $18,588.83, just as was contemplated by the eventuality
mentioned in the second paragraph of subdivision
(d) of paragraph VIII. We shall substantiate this by
a series of schedules prepared from the exhibits introduced into evidence.
SUBSTANTIATION OF FACT THAT ASSETS OF $18,588.83 MORE
THAN WAS NEEDED TO GIVE THE CORPORATION A NET WORTH
OF $100,000.00 WAS RECEIVED BY THE CORPORATION AND THAT
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE RECEIPT OF THAT SUM IT ASSUMED
THIS OBLIGATION. THE ASSETS RECEIVED IN THIS AMOUNT OF
$18,588.83 COMPENSATED FOR THE LIABILITY ASSUMED IN THE
SAME AMOUNT, THE CORPORATION STILL HAVING A NET WORTH
OF $1 00,000.00.

The pre-incorporation agreement contemplated
that so much of Perry's assets as would be needed to
pay off the debts would be reduced to cash. Originally it was thought that $164,000.00 in cash would be
needed and that is why it was contemplated that cash
would be available in the amount of $168,000.00, or
$4,000.00 more than was necessary to pay the expected debts. However, the actual debts were only
$142,809.90, and by deferring the Sher Khan debt
the cash required to pay the remaining debts was
$124,221.07. Thus the fund provided by the $80,-
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000.00 cash received on the mortgage and the $50,000.00 for Zolezzi's contribution to the capital stock
was more than enough to pay this amount of $124,221.07. Hence it became unnecessary to reduce the
other assets to cash, and, instead, the corporation
took over Perry's assets at market value. Therefore
the assets taken over would not result in their being
$4,000.00 of actual cash or any amount of actual
cash, but instead, the new corporation would have
tangible assets which were t:Qe equivalent of $4,000.00 in cash. Whether the corporation would have
had available in cash, or the equivalent thereof, only
$4,000.00 after the payment of all the debts of Perry,
including the debt to Sher Khan, as stated in the first
paragraph of subdivision (d), or whether it would
have had available in cash, or the equivalent of cash,
$4,000.00, plus the $18,588.83, of which it was temporarily deferring payment to Sher Khan, the end
result sought to be obtained by the pre-incorporation
agreement was accomplished. This end result sought
to be obtained by the pre-incorporation agreement
was that there was to be a net worth of $100,000.00
in the new corporation upon its formation. (See par.
IX of Exhibit B, which states:
"After giving effect to the foregoing
transactions the new corporation will commence with a balance sheet substantially as
follows:" (Then follows the balance sheet
which we have inserted in the brief as "Schedule 1-A. See page 52)
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The balance sheet in Schedule 1A shows what
the balance sheet of the new corporation was ·required to look like if Perry had actually· ·paid the
debt, including the Sher Khan debt. Although it was
anticipated that the Sher Kahn debt might not be
paid, a second balance sheet was not inserted in the
exhibit to show what such a balance sheet would look
like. To prove that in each case the same end result
namely, a net worth of $100,000.00 is reached in both
situations, we have prepared Schedule 1B (page 53).
We stated above that the seller, Perry, and the
buyer, the defendant corporation, estimated Perry's
debts as $164,000.00, and that estimate included an
account of Sher Khan in the amount of 23,588.83.
This estimate of $164,000.00 was too high for several
reasons. There had been paid a few days before this
agreement was signed the sum of $5,000.00 to Sher
Khan, and by going to his creditors Perry had secured
a reduction in the amount of his debts so that the debts
that he actually owed were $142,809.90. Therefore it
was not necessary to provide a fund of $168,000.00
in order to pay the debts and to have a remainder of
$4,000.00 The amount necessary to accomplish this
purpose was $146,809.90. The mortgage loan from
the First National Bank of $80,000.00 and the $50,000.00 stock subscription of Zolezzi, provid~d $130,000.00, so only $16,809.90 additional was required.
However, Perry had available assets of $56,16-3.33 in his old business. In order to pay for his
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capital stock of $49,000.00 and to repay his loan as
required in paragraph VIII, only $30,000.00 of personal property was required. The remaining $26,163.33 was also transferred to the corporation so that
$9,353.43 more was paid into the corporation in personal property assets than was required. The plant
and equipment values were $1,646.57 in ex<;ess of
$135,000.00 required. Together these two items
equal $11,000.00, and they were paid into the corporation in lieu of the $10,000.00 promissory note
which Perry was going to contribute and the $1,000.00 in cash which Perry was going to pay in.
Therefore, Perry contributed the exact amount of
the property required of him_ by the agreement, and
then when the payment of the Sher Khan account
was deferred, the sum of $18,588.83 was left on hand
in the hands of the corporation.
The actual balance sheet of the corporation
taken from the books of the company immediately
after the corporation's books were Qpened shows that
the corporation had a net worth of $100,000.00, even
after setting up the Sher Khan debt as a liability c.tnd
after setting up an additional liability to Mr. Perry
of $4,310.40. If this sum of $4,310.40 had not been
owing to Mr. Perry, individually, this balance sheet,
Schedule 1C would have shown the same balancing
figure of $198,588.83. We point this out so it will
not be thought there is any conflict between the balance sheets, Schedules 1B and 1C. The balancing
figure in Schedule 1C is $202,899.23, including the
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additional item of $4,310.40, and el~minating that
item, it would have been $198,588.83, the same as in
Schedule 1B. These three schedules are found in
this brief at pages 52-54.
Further proof of the fact that the corporation
received $18,588.83 more than was contemplated is
found in Exhibit L, prepared by Mr. Helwing, an
auditor who appeared as witness for the plaintiff.
This exhibit proves conclusively that not only $18,588.83 more than was necessary to pay the other
debts and for the capital stock was actually turned
over, but in fact, that the excess amount turned over
amounted to $23,899.23, and after recording the assumption of this liability of $18,588.83, and allowing
for the $1,000.00 that had been thought necessary to
pay for the last $1,000.00 worth of the capital stock
there was still an excess amount of assets paid in by
Mr. Perry of $4,310.40.
Further proof of this same fact is found in Exhibit G, which is the "Accounts Receivable Account" of
W. R. Perry on the books of the corporation. Line 10
of that exhibit shows a credit balance in W. R. Perry's account of $4,310.40, which means that Mr.
Perry had actually paid that much more in assets
than was required to pay all of Perry's debts, including the debt of Sher Khan. It cannot therefore be
stated that the corporation did not receive assets from
Mr. Perry as consideration for its promise to pay this
debt nor that it did not agree to pay the ol?ligation
owing to the plaintiff.
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THE PROVISIONS OF EXHIBIT 8, THE PRE-INCORPORATION AGREEMENT BECAME BINDING ON THE CORPORATION AND THEREFORE
IS A SUFFICIENT WRITING TO MEET THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

After discussing these facts and making analyses of these exhibits, we pass to the law to show that
the written contract of W. R. Perry and Stephen
Zolezzi became the writing of the corporation. The
cases do not require that in order for a promotion
agreement to be binding that the agreement be
signed by the stockholders owning 100% of the capital stock.
The only question is whether the corporation
accepted the benefits of the contract. See Wall vs.
Niagara Mining Company, 20 Utah 474; 59 Pac. 399.
We quote the following from that case:
"The most important question presented
is whether 'promoters', or persons who contemplate organizing a corporation, can make
contracts which will bind it after it becomes a
legal entity. It is contended by counsel for
the appellant that a contract made for a corporation before it has an actual existence is not
enforceable by or against it. This contention
is too broad. It indicates that a corporation
cannot, even in the exercise of its powers to
make contracts, accept and adopt a contract
made for it by the promoters before its existence as an entity. The legitimate sequence of
this would be that a corporation, upon full and
complete organization under the statute,
might accept and adopt such a contract, receive and retain the benefits thereof, and at
the same time be absolved from its burdens.
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We have no sympathy with a doctrine that
would lead to such results; that might be employed as an instrument of fraud and injustice
to the unwary. It may be assumed as true
that promoters and incorporators have no
standing in any relation of agency, since that
which has no existence can have no agent,
and, in the absence of any act authorizing
them so to do, can enter into no contract, nor
transact any business, which shall bind the
proposed corporation after it becomes a distinct entity; but, notwithstanding this be true,
still such promoters and incorporators may,
acting in their individual capacities, make contracts·in furtherance of the incorporation, and
for its benefit, and, after the incorporation
comes into being as an artificial person under
the forms of law, it may, at least under the
weight of American authority, accept and
adopt such contracts, and thereupon they become its own contracts, and may be enforce by
or against it. This the corporation may do, not
because of an agency, on the part of the incorporators, before the existence of the entity,
for there is none, but because of its own in.;.
herent powers as a body corporate to make
contracts. Moreover, the adoption of such a
contract need not be by express action of the
corporation, entered on its minutes, but may
be inferred from its own acts and acquiescence, or those of its agents, and there need
be no express acceptance; or the corporation
may be bound by the contracts of its promoters, if made so by its charter, which it has
accepted and to which it was agreed. Unless,
however, there be an acceptance and adoption
thereof in some such way, the corporation will
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not, in general, be bound by the contracts of
its promoters and incorporators, made for it
before its complete organization. Where a
contract is made by and with promoters,
which is intended to inure to the benefit of
a corporation about to be organized, such contract will be regarded as in the nature of an
open offer, which the corporation, upon complete organization, may accept and adopt or
not, as it chooses; but, if it does accept and
adopt and retain the benefits of it, it cannot
reject any liability under it, but in such case
will be bound to perform the contract, upon
the principle that one who accepts and adopts
a contract which another undertook to perform in his name and on his behalf must take
the burden with the benefit. In Mor. Priv. Corp.,
548, it is said: 'A corporation may, however,
make itself responsible for such acts and contracts by subsequently adopting them. The
liability of the corporation, under these circumstances, does not rest upon a supposed
agency of the promoters, and a ratification of
their acts, but upon the immediate and volun~
tary act of the company. If an agreement is
made with promoters or persons about to form
a corporation, and the parties intend that the
corporation, when formed, shall become a
party to the agreement, such agreement would
usually constitute or include an open offer,
which may be accepted by the corporation after it is formed. And this is true, whether the
promoters are primarily liable or not.' So, in
Tayl. Priv. Corp. 87, the author says: 'It may ·
be said, generally, that a corporation, when
organized, in the absence of ratification on its
part, is not responsible for the acts nor bound
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by the contracts of its promoters, unless made
so by its charter, which it has accepted and
thereby agreed to. But this is not identical
with the proposition that the corporation may
ignore the engagements entered into by its
promoters when it has had the benefit of them.
It cannot be said that the promoters were the
agents of the corporation, but, nevertheless,
the corporation may adopt such acts of its
promoters intended for its benefit, and may
ratify such of their contracts made on its behalf, as would have been within the powers of
the corporation after its organization, and this
it may do notwithstanding that it was not organized -when those contracts were made; and,
if it ratifies their contracts, then, in the absence of express agreement with the other
contracting party, the corporation must be
held to have assumed the liabilities which
would have attached to it had its promoters
been its agents at the time when they contracted on its behalf.' In Alger, Promoters
Corp, 206, it wa~ said: 'The ~cceptance or
adoption may be implied from the acts of the
corporation, -'acts from which you can infer,
and from which you ought to infer,' that there
was an adoption of the contract by the corporation after its formation. This may be inferred from the acceptance by the corporation
of property directly delivered to it by the
other party to the contract, or received from
him through the promoters, to whom it was
delivered to be turned over to the corporation
when formed; or it may be inferred from the
retention by the corporation of the benefit of
services rendered under the contract subsequent, or ordinarily prior, to the formation
of the corporation., " (Citing many cases.)
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This case is followed by a more recent Utah
case, Murray vs. Monter, 90 Utah 105; 60 Pac. (2)
960 at 962:
"The general rule of law is that promoters who undertake to organize a corporation
cannot bind the corporation by their contracts
and agreements made before the corporation
is organized. Tanner vs. Sinaloa Land & Fruit
Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 Pac. 586, Ann. Cas.
1916C, 100; Wall vs. Niagara Min. & S. Co. 20
Utah, 474, 59 P. 399, 401; 1 Thompson on
Corps. (3d Ed) 106; 4 Cook on Corps. (8th
Ed) 707. But that the corporation after incorporation may accept and adopt such a contract which thereupon becomes its own contract, which may be enforced by or against it.
Wall vs. Niagara Mining & S. Co. (supra). The
rule is succinctly stated in 4 Cook on Corps.
(8th Ed) 707, p. 2894: 'A corporation accepting the benefits of the contract of its incorporators must accept the burd~n, and a promoter's contract which has been ratified or adopted by the corporation, or the benefits of
which have been accepted by the corporation
with knowledge of such contract, may be enforced against it.' "
Counsel cited cases which state only the general
rule, namely, that corporation is not bound by a promotion agreement. He does not refer to this exception to the rule which is discussed in the two cases
which we have just quoted from.
We have an almost identical state of facts to our
case in the case of Balfour Guthrie & Co. vs. Breslaur,
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90 Wash. 441; 156 Pac. 398. In that case an agreement to which were subscribed the initials of the
incorporators of this proposed corporation, mentioned
that the debts of the former business were to be assumed by the new corporation. However, the minutes of the new corporation did not make an express
assumption of the debts. The court held that was unnecessary and that the assumption of the debts could
be implied from the fact that the corporation took
over the assets, subject to the express promise to pay
the debts of the former business. Since the provisions
of Exhibit B became binding upon the corporation,
there is a writing on behalf of the corporation sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds.
EVEN IF EXHIBIT B IS NOT BINDING ON THE CORPORATION
THERE ARE OTHER WRITINGS OF THE CORPORATION TO
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Though counsel feels that we may well rest at
this point on the proposition of showing that there
was a writing sufficient to meet the statute of Frauds
in the form of Exhibit B, nevertheless, without burdening the court too far, we should like to point out
the additional exhibits which would be sufficient if
there were not an Exhibit B.
Exhibit C is a writing by the corporation's own
accountants and signed by them. It was admitted
that Wells, Baxter & Miller, certified public accountants, were the agents of the corporation. The writing
was subsequent to the organization of the corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion.. The writing goes on to prove the complete performance of the agreement by the corporation. The
writing states that personal property assets of $56,~
163.33 (the total of the six items listed beginning
with the one labelled "Accounts Receivable") were
received by the corporation, as well as real property
having a value of $136,646.57, or a total of $192,809.90. It also proves that the total amount of the
liabilities paid out by Perry were $124,221.07 and
that capital stock of $50,000.00 was given to Perry,
or a total of $174,221.07, and it then states categorically that the difference between the amount of assets contributed of $192,809.90 and the amounts paid
out for Perry's debts and his .capital stock totaling
$174,221.07, or $18,588.83, the amount of the debt
owing to Sher Khan was expressly assumed. This
statement is found on page 1 of Exhibit C, in these
words: " * * *account payable of Nielson & Perry
to Sher Khan assumed by Perry-Zolezzi, Inc." This
writing should also be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, namely, that an
agreement to assume the debt of another must be in
writing. See McConnell vs. Brilliant, 17 111, 354 at
360; 65 Am Dec. 661, which states:
''Any kind of writing from a solemn deed
down to mere hasty notes or memoranda,
books, papers or letters, will suffice."
Exhibit D and G are writings sufficient. They
are of the books of account of the corporation prepared by the corporation's agents.
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Exhibit D, an entry on the corporate books when
the corporation took over the assets, specifically records that the credit accounts payable, Sher Khan
$18,588.83, was entered (in the words of the accountant): "To record receipt of assets and assumption of liabilities of W. R. Perry." These are the exact
quotes from page 3 of the corporation General Journal.
Exhibit G, line 8, shows that there was a credit
to W. R. Perry of $21,564.11 in consideration of
"transfer of assets of W. R. Perry." This is the recordation on the account of W. R. Perry on the same
General Journal entry (Exhibit D), showing that the
corporation assumed liabilities of W. R. Perry.
Exhibit H, a letter written by Perry-Zolezzi, Inc.,
dated November 29, 1946, is also a sufficient writing.
That letter states: "We will not be able to pay Sher
Khan on December 1st but we will be in a position
to do so by January 1Oth." · This letter was written
after September 21, 1946, upon which date the corporation_had acknowledged the debt of $18,588.83, by
paying the corporate check in the amount of $3,588.83
on the debt.
"When the party sought to be charged
has admitted the contract in writing over his
signature, the statute is complied with no matter tp whom the writing may have been addressed." 27 C. J. 301.
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EVEN IF THERE WERE NO WRITING THE AGREEMENT TO ASSUME THE DEBT IS ENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS A PROMISE
MADE BY ONE WHO HAS RECEIVED PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
UPON AN UNDERTAKING TO APPLY IT PURSUANT TO SUCH
PROMISE.

"33-5-6 PROMISE TO ANSWER. FOR OBLIGATION OF ANOTHERWHEN NOT REQUIRED TO BE
IN WRITING.
A promise to answer for the obligation of
another in any of the following cases is
deemed an original obligation of the promisor
and need not be in writing:
( 1) Where the promise is made by one
who has received property of another upon an
undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a discharge
from an obligation, in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise."
This section is a statutory enactment of the common law rule that where a promise is given to pay
the debt of a.nother in consideration of the receipt
of property, that the agreement need not be in writing. The common law rule is set out in the case of
Feldman vs. Maguire, 55 Pac. 8 72 (Ore.). The plaintiff was privileged to make proof under the pleadings
of either a written or oral agreement. See 27 C. J.
378, N. 27, citing the case of Slingerland vs. Slingerland, 46 Minn. 100; 48 N.W. 605. The statement
from C. J. reads as follows:
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"A complaint alleging an agreement to
convey real estate, without· stating whether it
was written or oral, and alleging also such a
part performance as would take an oral agreement out of the statute, is supported by proof
of either a written contract or an oral one
partly performed."
We will not repeat the matter already discussed
to show that the defendant received $18,588.83 worth
of assets plus $4310.40 and that it promised to pay
this note owing to the plaintiff. If the defendant
corporation takes the position that the debts of the
defendant had all been paid except this note owing to
Sher Khan, then the book entries of the corporation
(see Exhibit D) show that the corporation received
assets of $40,152.94 in August 1946, in consideration
of which it assumed and agreed to pay the note. We
refer back to our discussion of this matter on page
8 of our brief.
EVEN IF THERE WERE NO WRITING ON THE CORPORATION
BOOKS SHOWING THAT THE CORPORATION ASSUMED THE
DEBT THE LAW WOULD IMPLY THAT WHERE THE CORPORA·
TION RECEIVED THE ASSETS OF A PREDECESSOR BUSINESS
THAT IT ASSUMED THE DEBTS OF THE PREDECESSOR
BUSINESS.

There is even a stronger case where there was
no writing whatsoever, and even though the Bulk
Sales Statute was not invoked under the pleadings
in that case, nevertheless the court held that the new
corporation had assumed the liabilities of the former
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business. S·. & J. Supply vs. Warren (Qkla) 133 Pac.
(2) 201. The court in that case held that the assumption may be express or it may be implied from
the circumstances. The opinion is brief and it follows:

"A corporation organized to take over
the business of a partnership or of an individual may assume the liabilities of the partnership or the individual and thereupon become
liable to the partnership creditors. The assumption may, according to some authorities,
be either express or implied. It may be implied from the circumstances. 13 Am. Jur.
Corporations, Section 1249; Lamkin vs. Baldwin & Lamkin Mfg. Co. 72 Conn. 57; 43 A.
593, 1042, 44 L. R. A. 786; Zeimer vs. C. G.
Bretting Mfg. Co. 147 Wis. 252, 133 N. W. 139,
Ann Cas. 1912D 1275. This court in Shirvin
Operating. Co. vs. Southwestem Electric C., 71
Old. 25, 174 P. 1069, 1073, 15 A. L. R. 1104,
said: "A long line of decisions may be found
wherein it is held that when a corporation is
merged into or absorbed by another, which
continues its business, and where there is no
substantial change of ownership,_ nor in the
kind of business carried on, then the new corporation is but the successor of the former concern, and is liable as such for its debts."
See also, McCarthy vs. Liberty National
Bank, 73 Okl. 275, 175 P. 940, 7 A.L.R. 137;
Cunningham vs. Spencer, 111 Okl. 217,239
P. 444; Burkholder vs. Okmulgee Coal Co. supra. We are of the opinion that the case comes
within the rule of a continuing corporation
taking the place of, and the assets of, the for ...
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mer unincorporated entity. There is no denial
that A. M. Strange, president of the S. & J.
Supply Company, ordered and received all the
goods, wares and merchandise as manager of
the particular organization at the time the
purchases were made. There is no denial that
the account has not been paid." (Italics ours.)
We conclude the First Cause of Action is sustained by proof of the writings to e_stablish that the
corporation defendant assumed and agreed to pay
the defendant; second, that even if there were no
writings that there was a promise by the defendant
corporation to pay this note, and that having received
property of the defendant, Perry, upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, the case
falls under the provisions of Section 33-5-6, U.C.A.
1943, and, third, even if there was not an express
promise to pay the debt, that the promise is implied
from the circumstances of the case. This third conclusion follows from the case of S. & J. Supply Company vs. Warren, hereinabove discussed.
It seems to us that we can conclude this discussion on the First Cause of Action by stating that subsidiary findings to which the defendant corporation
ubjects are fully sustained by the evidence. The corporation did pay $3588.83 on September 21, 1946, to
apply on this note and the defendant, Perry, was the
President and General Manager of the corporation,
and had the authority to make the payment. It was
so testified. The defendant pleaded lack of authority
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on the part of Perry, the President and General Manager, but not one word of evidence was offered in
support of that plea; in fact, the defendant offered no
evidence whatever. Upon the question of payment
of the $3588.83 the evidence is that the corporation
auditors and the stockholders holding 100% of the
stock, knew of the payment and never made any objection to its having been made.
REPLY TO FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

Appellant, the defendant corporation, contends
that some of the properties transferred by Perry to
the defendant corporation were not of the character
of assets the transfer of which are subject to the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act. Appellant lists the
pr'operties which it considers to be in that classification on page 59 of its Brief. Respondent disagrees
with that listing and herewith submits the asset section of the balance Sheet, Exhibit J, which lists all of
the assets transferred by Perry to the corporation and
their nature and character:
''ASSETS PAID IN By W. R. Perry as per
OPENING ENTRIES
Item 1 Land .............. $ 6,455.00
Item 2 Building ........ 93,800.94
Item 3 Dwelling ...... 1,595.50
Item 4 Furniture &
Fixtures ........ 1,849.99
Item 5 Machinery &
equipment .... 32,945.14 136,646.57
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Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item

6 Merchandise 16,832.36
7 Supplies -------- 11,401.41
8 Accourits
Receivable ·--- 26,768.74
50.00
9 Meter Deposit
10 State Insur.
100.00
Fund dep. ---11 Prepaid
Insurance ---- 1,010.82
12 Prepaid
310.68
Freight ------·13 Prepaid
Taxes ............
37.70
14 Prepaid
Expenses ---···
7.55

56?519.26
$193,165.83

We herewith list those assets which the corporation would admit are subject to the provisions of the
Bulk Sales Act. They· are the following:
Item
Item
Item
Item

4 Furniture & Fixt................. $ 1,849.99
5 Machinery & Equipment .. 32,945.14
6 Merchandise ·····---···-············· 16,832.36
7 Supplies ............................... 11,401.41
$63,028.90

E~hibit

B stated that money to pay the debts was
to be made available from the $80,000.00 received
on the mortgage of the real estate and the cash of
$50,000.00 (Ex. B. Par. VI quoted on page 9 of this
brief.) This $130,000.00 was more than enough to pay
the debts of Perry, exclusive of the Sher Khan debt.
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They amounted to $124,221.07. The only debt of
Perry outstanding when the above listed assets,· subject to the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act, were·
transferred, was the one debt owing to the plaintiff
Sher Khan in the amount of $18,588.83. The $63,028.90 worth of assets transferred was. three times
more than needed to pay this debt.
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 6

H this court holds that the plaintiff has stated
and sustained either its First or Second Causes of Action, then the remainder of this brief becomes academic.

At the beginning of our brief we mentioned we
would discuss Assignments 1, 2, 3 and 6 after answering the Assignments of Error directed at the First
and Second Causes of Action on their merits.
We preface our discussion with some general
statements concerning the doctrine of "Election of
Remedies'':
"It has been said that the doctrine is a
harsh rule which is not to be extended and
that it is to be applied by the court with a wide
discretion in order that it may not be made an
instrument of oppr~ssion." 28 C.J.S. 1058.
"The purpose of the doctrine of election of
remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedies but to prevent double redress for a single
wrong." 18 Am. Juris 131, note 13.
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Assignments 1, 2 and 6 are essentially the same
and we shall discuss them together. In each of these
Assignments the appellant relies on the same general
proposition stating that:
In the First Assignment of Error, "plaintiff seeks
to enforce the contract in the First Cause of Action,
and invalidate it in the Second Cause of Action," (as
to first Assignment of Error seeR. 57 quoted at page
2 of our brief) ; as to the Second Assignment of Error
stating (App. Br. p. 35): "That by filing his First
Cause of Action and by attaching funds of defendant
corporation on the basis of a valid contract· plaintiff
had elected to treat the sale by Perry to the corporation as valid, and that he had- elected his remedy in
the case"; as to the Sixth Assignment of Error (App.
Br. p. 74) "(He (plaintiff) is the one who seeks to enforce the /contract in the First Cause of Action and invalidate it in the Second Cause of Action."
Appellant contends that the plaintiff has treated
a contract as valid in the First Cause of Action and·
that in his Second Cause of Action he has treated·the
same contract as invalid.
At the outset we assert that a complete answer
is that in the First Cause of Action we refer to an entirely different contract than the contract to sell and
purchase that is referred to in the Second Cause of
Action. The First Cause of Action pleads a contract
that the appellant received property upon a promise
to apply it to the payment of the respondent's debt,
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and that cause of action is sustained by proof of the
receipt of the property in the amount of $18,588.83
that was set aside for the Sher Khan debt and the
promise to pay the debt of the plaintiff. The Second
Cause of Action refers to a sale and the transfer of
assets of not only $18,588.83, but a transfer of all of
the.assets of a seller to a buyer (this corporate defendant), and on account of which sale the law imposes
a duty to deliver a proportionate share of the purchase
price to each creditor of the· seller.
The two causes of action are based upon separate and distinct facts. In the First Cause of Action
we plead the assumption of the debt and then proved
the contract by which the debt was assumed and it
was supported by the consideration of the transfer of
the real property from Perry to the corporate defendant. That is sufficient to permit recovery. The Second Cause of Action may be considered to be proven
by showing the transfer of the personal property making the sale subject to the Bulk Sales Act, and therefore by force of statute the corporate defendant is
liable for this debt. Thus, in the Second Cause of Action, we need not prove or rely upon anything that
was alleged or proved in the First Cause of Action.
This view is supported in 28 C.J.S. 1065, which states:
"The doctrine does not require an election
between distinct causes of action arising out
of separate and distinct facts."
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In order for the causes of action to be inconsistent, one of the causes must admit a fact an·d the other
deny the same fact, not a legal conclusion. See Jaloff
vs. United Auto, 120 Ore. 381, 250 Pac. 71'7, where·
the following statement is found:
"In order that an election to pursue one
remedy shall preclude resort to another, the.
two must be inconsistent. It follows that a
person may pursue any number of consistent"
concurrent remedies until he obtains satisfac-.
tion from some of them. No estoppel by election arises where there is but one cause of action and alternative or different forms of relief are sought."
The latest Utah cases on the subject are:
Kennedy vs. Griffith, 98 Utah, 183; 95 Pac. (2)
742·
' Bank vs. Spanish Fork, 153 Pac.
Commercial
(2) 547;
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 81
Utah, 212; 17 Pac. (2) 239.
See also Labor Hall Association vs. Danielson, 163
Pac. (2) 167; 161 A.L.R. 1079.
Where the law affords distinct but not incon·
sistent remedies, the election to follow one does not
operate as a waiver of the other. See Electrical Prod.
vs. Haniotis, 170 Okla. 144; 39 Pac. (2) 36.
"The fact that the plaintiff had previously attempted to hold the defendant liable as a
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- party would not prevent a subsequent suit
against him as guarantor of the same contract
since one remedy was not inconsistent with
the other." W. R. Rawleigh vs. Burkholder,
50 Ga. App. 514; 1 S.E. (2) 609.
Secondly, even though it be stated that the First
and Second Causes of Action are based upon the same
contract, the plaintiff in its First Cause of Action
treated the contract as valid as between the seller
and the buyer, and the plaintiff did likewise in his
Second ·cause of Action, that is, treat the contract of
sale as being valid as between the seller and buyer,
adding only the entirely consistent allegation tltat as
between the buyer's and seller's creditors, the contract by force of statute was null and void. In both
causes of action, as between the seller and buyer, the
contract is treated as being valid. At no time does
the plaintiff attempt to assert that the contract was
valid between the buyer and the plaintiff, the creditor. In the Second Cause of Action the allegation is
that the contract is so far invalid insofar as it affects
the plaintiff, and that allegation is in no wise contrary to a conclusion that the contract is valid as between the plaintiff and the defendant. To sustain
the Second Cause of Action it is necessary only to assert the invalidity of the contract between the buyer
and the plaintiff, not between the buyer and the
seller. This view is sustained by the following cases:
"The existing creditors who are not paid
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sary to collect their debts. They may not -in
any other sense void it or set it aside." Dodd vs.
Raines, 1 Fed (2) 658.
"However, notwithstanding the statutory
provision that the sale shall be void, it is not
a nullity. As against creditors of the se]Jer or
transferors it is not void, but voidable in proper
and timely proceedings, brought by creditors
to set it aside and as is shown infra, Section485, that the sale is a violation of the statutes
in no way affects the validity thereof as far as
the immediate parties to it are concerned."
37 C.J.S. 1327, note 93.
As this last quotation shows, the Second Cause
of Action does not attempt to plead that the sale .is
invalid as between the parties to the sale. By force
of the statute under such facts the sale is invalid as
to creditors. Therefore, in the Second Cause of Action, the most that can be found is an allegation that
the sale is invalid as to creditors. _In the First Cause
of Action, the most that can be found is that the sale
is valid as between the buyer and the seller. Since the
defendant's premise is that plaintiff in his First
Cause of Action treated the contract as valid, and in
the Second Cause of Action as invalid, there is no basis
for the application of the doctrine of the election of
Remedies.
Thirdly, it cannot actually be said that the plain·
tiff treated the contract as being valid or invalid in
the Second Cause of Action. The plaintiff proceeded,
in his Second Cause of Action, as the statute directs,
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namely;· to disregard the contract. The remedy of a
creditor under the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act
is not set out in Chapter 2 of Title 3 which is the Bulk
Sales Act, but for the remedy of any creditor as to
whom a transaction is fraudulent is stated in 33-1-15,
U.C.A. 1943 which reads:
"Where a conveyance or obligation is
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when
a claim is matured, may, as against any person, except a person for fair consideration,
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of
the purchase; * * *
( 1) have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to
satisfy his claim, or
(2) Disregard the conveyance and attach
or levy execution upon the property conveyed.''
Thus, proceeding under subdivision 2, the plaintiff is not required to say whether the contract is
valid or not; he is merely privileged to disregard it.
See Flaks vs. DeBerry, 53 Wyo. 203, 79 Pac. (2) 825,
116 A.L.R. 1191. The court states at 1194 of the
A.L.R. annotation:
"The right of the creditor to disregard the
conveyance and attach the property presupposes that the title, for the purpose of enabling
the creditor to enforce his claim, remains in
the grantor. See American Trust vs. Kaufman,
276 P. 35, 119 Atl. 749, Rutherford vs. Carr, 99
Tex. 101; 87 S.W. 815; Bigelow on Fraudulent
Conveyances page 464. The attachment gives
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the creditor a lien which (at leait before the
uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act). was necessary as the basis of an action to set the conveyance aside. See Platte County Bank vs.
Frantz, 33 Wyo. 326, at 336; 239 Pac. 531;
Glenn on Fraudulent Conveyances, Section
35."
Therefore, in this case we have proceeded under
the provisions of subdivision 2 of Section 33-1-15. It
is important to note that the law does not say that
the transfer is invalid. It only states that the creditor
may disregard it.
Fourth, the doctrine of Election of Remedies applies when a person who has sued in affirmance of a
contract then proceeds to a contrary remedy, a rescission of the contract. The remedy provided by the
Bulk Sales Act is not to rescind the contra.ct of sale;
it is rather an affirmance of the contract of sale, and
asks only that the proceeds of the sale be applied as
the statute directs. Even though one cause of action
would be considered to be in affirmance of the contract and one in disaffirmance of the contract, we
desire to point out to the court that the doctrine of
Election of Remedies in such a situation applies only · · · ·
when the action i& between parties to the contract.
Third persons who are not privy to the contract are
not bound by ~he rule. See 28 C.J.S. 1076, Note 23,
where the following quotation is taken from the case
of Newmann vs. Guaranty Trust Company of New
York, 276 N.Y.S. 873; 243 App. Div. 632:
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"The limitation 6f the right to prosecute
simultaneous actions in affirmance and disaffrrmance of contract, such as an action to recover damages for fraud and action for money
had and received, relates only to actions between the parties to the contract."
In the Second Assignment of Error the appellant
contends that by levying a writ of attachment against
the funds of the appellant, the plaintiff elected to
treat said conveyance and transfer of property from
the defendant, Perry, to the defendant corporation
as a valid conveyance, and has elected his remedy
herein.
This attachment was levied in April of 1947, or
nearly nine months after the original conveyance
from Perry to the defendant corporation was made.
By that time the defendant corporation could have
had other property different from that acquired from
the defendant, Perry. Even if the attachment were
made against the property originally transferred to
the defendant corporation, still according to the case
of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company vs. Jerasik (1931) 235 N.W. 836; 254 Michigan 836,
"The institution of an attachment against
the property in question in another county is
not an election of remedies which will prevent
the plaintiff from bringing a suit in equity to _
set aside a quit-claim deed in a fraudulent conveyance."
Though the plaintiff did not prevail for

r~asons
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with which we are not concerned in this action, the
plaintiff in the case of Electrical Products vs. 'Smyser,
143 Pac. (2) 452, proceeded with. both c~uses of
action exactly as the plaintiff has done in the instant
case. The court stated:
,
"The appellant contends that it was entitled to recovery, first, because the plaintiff
agreed to assume to pay the indebtedness, and,
second, because in making the transfer and
sale the partfes did not comply with the Bulk
Sales Law."
In this action we have proceeded in that same
manner. The defendant in the case just quoted from
did not raise the contention here made that there has
been an election of remedies.
We respectfully submit that the doctrine of
Election of Remedies does not apply for the four
reasons which we have discussed.
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 AS
IT RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL

We can do no more in discussing this Second
Assignment of Error than submit to this court the
discussion on the Second Assignment of Error that
was contained, in our brief submitted to the trial
court. The following is quoted from that brief:
"At the tri«jl, counsel complained of the
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fendant pleaded that this plaintiff was estopped
to claim a violation under the Bulk Sales Statute. First it pleaded that it had believed that
the Sher Khan debt was paid in full by the
time the transfer was made to it and that that
belief rose from a representation of the plaintiff (See paragraph 1, page 4, of Defendant's
Answer to Amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint adding Second Cause of Action.) It
also pleaded that the basis of the estoppel as
against this plaintiff was: "That the plaintiff
orally consented to the sale and that the plaintiff agreed with the defendant Perry that the
plaintiff would look to the defendant Perry for
the payment of said obligation from his personal· funds and would· regard said obligation
· · as a personal indebtedness of the defendant
W. R. Perry." Although the court generously
stated that if such facts could be proved he
would permit proof of them, the defendants
offered no evidence of the facts which it contended were sufficient to create an estoppel.
We must of course assume that they have no
such evidence, not only from their failure to
adduce the evidence but from the fact that the
written books and records of the corporation
set out. contrary facts. However that may be,
even if they could establish those facts it would
not create an estoppel because it was not pleaded that the corporate defendant suffered a loss
by reason of the alleged misrepresentation or
t;hat it acted to its detriment on account of
those alleged misrepresentations. It does not
plead that because of these alleged misrepresentations it paid the amount directly to Perry
or that it expended the money in another way.
The elements of an estoppel are clearly set out
in the case of Barber vs. Anderson (Utah) 274
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Pac. 136 at 1382. See also Cook vs. Cook- (Utah)
174 Pac. (2) 434 at 436. The court there affirms the Barber vs. Anderson case and states:
"To constitute an estoppel there must
be conduct amounting to a misrepresentaoP
tion or concealment of material facts;
these facts must be known to the party
sought to be estopped and unknown to the
party who claims the benefit of the estoppel and who relying upon such conduct
acted upon it to his loss. See Barber vs.
Anderson, 73 Utah 357; 274 Pac. 136,
wherein this court discussed the elements
of estoppel. In the instant case there ~s no
misrepresentation or concealment of any
material fact known to respondent and
unknown to appellant.''
So in the instant case, while corporate defendant pleaded that it believed that the debt
of Sher Khan was paid, it does not say that it
entertained that belief because of a misrepresentation of the plaintiff. Therefore, the very
frrst essential element is lacking, namely, misrepresentation.
Secondly, the corporate defendant cannot
with good grace contend that it did not know
that the debt of Sher Khan was unpaid. Its
own books testified to that fact and its own
records show that it had made a payment on
that account.
Third, the corporate defendant did not
plead any injury to itself and so in fact the
frrst separate defense was wholly insufficient
t<? set up an estoppel and the court so held and
therefore struck the first separate defense.
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If that were not enough, the court in the
case of H. C. Bay Company vs. Ridnour, 206
S.W. (S.D.) 463 held that a buyer in a case
coming under the Bulk Sales Act must comply
with the statute and may not safely rely on
the seller's statement that he has no creditors.
On this point we also cite the following:
"Good faith on the part of the transferee will not excuse his failure to comply
with the statutory requirements." Galbreath vs. Okla. State Bank, 36 Okla. 8070,
130 Pac. 541."
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. The
· procedural blocks which the appellant seeks to set
up lack substance. One judgment only was obtain~d
on both causes of action and both causes of action
were directed at the effort to collect only one debt.
The corporation defendant by seeking a reversal of
the judgment seeks to enrich itself at the expense of
the plaintiff. This corporation defendant should not
be unjustly enriched by this large sum of money and
hence this judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ
Attorneys for Respondent.
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SCHEDULE NO. 1 (A)
Balance sheet taken from Exhibit "B", peragraph 9, which sets out what
the proposed balance sheet of the corporation was to show, namely, a
net worth of $100,000.00, in order to meet the requirements of the agreement, if the debt of Sher Khan were not assumed.
-ITEM NO.
ASSETS:
1. Cash transferred from First National Bank of Salt Lake City, after
paying in full all outstanding liabilities of the partnershiP-•--------------

$4,000.00

2. Total cash and cash items to be delivered to First National Bank,
Paragraph 6 hereof_______________________ _ 168,000.00
3. Less:
Liabilities (Paragraph 5
hereof) -------·--------···----·---------------------- 164,000.00
4. Cash represented by stock subscription of Mr. Perry, Laverne
Perry and Leonard Elton _______________ _

1,000.00

5. Land buildings and equipment....

135,000.00

6. Supplies and prepayments (received from the partnership)---~----

15,000.00

7. Accounts receivable, supplies and
other assets to be received from
Mr. Perry out of his personal
assets --------------------------------------------------

15,000.00

8. Unpaid balance of $50,000.00 note
executed by Mr. Perry....................

10,000.00

9.

$180,000.00
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL:

10. Note to First National Bank of
Salt Lake City, secured by First
Mortgage or deed of trust on plant
and properties ---------------------------------11. Capital Stock:
Stock owned by W. R. Perry (including stock held in names of Laverne Perry and Leonard W. Elton
as nominess) ------------------------------------

50,000.00

12. Stock owned by Stephen Zolezzi,
(including stock held in name of
L. W. Wrixon as nominee)------------

50,000.00

13. TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

80,000.00

100,000.00
$180,000.00
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SCHEDULE NO. 1 (B)
Balance sheet to show what assets would be required to be taken over
from Perry to give the new corporation a net worth of $100,00.00 as required by Exhibit "B", Paragraph 9, when the debt of Sher Khan was
assumed.
ITEM NO.
ASSETS:
1. Cash and other asets transferred to
new corporation after paying all
outstanding liabilities of the partnership excepting account of Sher
Khan consisting of the three items:
(a) Cash required by paragraph 8 $4,000.00
(b) Amount reserved for Sher
Kahn account ------------·-----------···· 18,588.83
(c) Amount paid in lieu of note
\Jf ----------------------------------10,000.00
plus: cash of________________ 1,000.00
11~000.00

2.
3.

-4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

less: paid in by
equipment ---------------- 1.646.57 _9,353.43
Total cash items and the equivalent made available for payment ..
of debts as per Paragraph 6 ___________ _
Less: Liability actually paid as p~r..
Paragraph 5 of agreement (see
Schedule "C") ---------------------------------Cash represented by stock subscription of Mr. Perry, Laverne-Perry and Leonard W. Elton -------Land, buildings and equipment
(see Exhibit (" J") -------------------------Supplies and prepayments (re-_
ceived from the partnership)-------Accounts receivable, supplies and
other asets to be receive.d from _
Mr. Perry out of his personal assets -----------------------------------------------------Unpaid balance_ of $50,000.00 note
executed by Mr. Perry___________________ _

. 31,942.26
156,163.33
124;221.07

9.

136,646.57
15,000.00

15,000.00
$198,588.83

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL:
10. Note to the First National .Bank
of Salt Lake City, seclired by First
Mortgage or deed of trust on plant
80,000.00
and properties ---------------------------------11. Capital Stock:
Stock owned-by W: R.··Perry (in..:
eluding stock held in names of Laverne Perry and Leonard W. Elton
as nominees) ________________________ _._________ · 50;000.00
12. Stock owned by Stephen Zolezzi
(including stock held in name of
.... 1-00,000.00
L. W. Wrixom as nominee -------------- 50,000.00
18,588.83
13. Note due to Sher Khan---------------$198,588.83
14. TOTAL
LIABILITIES
AND
CAPITAL
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SCliEDULE NO. 1 (C)
Actual balance sheet of Perry-Zolezzi, Inc., at the conclusion of the opening entries.

ITEM NO.
ASSETS
1. Fixed assets taken over by corporation (see Exhibit "]") ................
2. Merchandise, supplies, accounts 56,163.33
receivable, etc., taken over by cor355.93
corporation from Perry (Exh. "J")
3. Cash on hand ................................... .
(For explanation of this item see
Note No. 1 below)
4. TOTAL ASSETS:
LIABILITIES:
5. First National Bank for mortgage
in~ebtedness ..................................... .
6. Owing to W. R. Perry on account
of contribution of assets in excess
of amount required as shown by
Liability Section of Exhibit "J" ....
7. Owing because of assumption of
debt of Sher Khan..........................

136,646.57

56,519.26
9,733.40

$202,899.23

80,000.00

·4,310.40
18,588.83

8. Capital stock

100,000.00

TOTAL:

$202,899.23

Note No. 1: On the record (page 201), Mr. Duke testified that there
was a balance of cash on hand after the formation of the corporation of
"about $9700.00." Instead of accepting that approximate figure, counsel
has prepared a tabulation from the record in this case that shows that
the exact amount of cash on hand was $9,733.40 and we have therefore
used that exact figure instead of the approximation made by Mr. Duke.
The exact calculation is determined from the following facts 'mtroduced
into evidence, namely:
·
Cash received from First National Bank on mortgage........
80,000.00
Cash received from Zol.ezzi for his contribution to capital
50,000.00
stock -·········-··-········-················-·········································--~
Total available cash with which to pay debts of Perry:........ $130,000.00
less: Debts of W. R. Perry actually paid by the corporation
(see liability section of Exhibit "J") ....................................
120,266.60
BALANCE of cash remaining in the hands of the corporation
$9,733.~
NOTE: The top part of this computation shows that after giving
effect to the transfers actually made, the corporation had a net worth of
$100,000.00 which was the exact net worth contemplated by the promo·
tion agreement.
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